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Abstract
There is often a discrepancy between quality of life estimates from patients and the general public. These
discrepancies are of concern to the disability community, who worry that the public does not understand
how valuable life can be for people with disabilities; policy planners, who must decide whose quality of life
estimates to use in economic analysis; and practitioners and patients facing difficult medical decisions, who
may have to worry that people have difficulty imagining unfamiliar health states. We outline several factors
that may contribute to these discrepancies. Discrepancies might occur because patients and the public
interpret health state descriptions differently – for example, making different assumptions about the recency
of onset of the health state, or about the presence of comorbidities. Discrepancies might also arise if
patients adapt to illness and the public does not predict this adaptation; because of response shift in how
people use quality of life scales; because of a focusing illusion whereby people forget to consider obvious
aspects of unfamiliar health states; because of contrast effects, whereby negative life events make people less
bothered by less severe negative life events; and because of different vantage points, with patients viewing
their illness in terms of the benefits that would result from regaining health, while the public views the
illness in terms of the costs associated with losing good health. Decisions about whose values to measure for
the purposes of economic analyses, and how to measure discrepancies, should take these potential con-
tributing factors into account.
Key words: Cost effectiveness analysis, Disability, Quality of life, Utility
Introduction
If asked to imagine they have paraplegia, most
people predict that it would have a devastating
effect on their quality of life [1]. Yet, there are
often discrepancies between the quality of life es-
timates of patients and the public [2–11]. For ex-
ample, the general public estimates the health
related quality of life (HRQoL) of dialysis at a
value of 0.39 (on a scale where 0 represents death
and 1 represents perfect health), whereas dialysis
patients estimate their HRQoL at 0.56 [12].
Patients without colostomies estimate the HRQoL
of living with a colostomy at 0.80, while patients
with colostomies rate their own HRQoL at 0.92
[13]. In fact, in a famous study, the happiness of
people who had recently developed paraplegia or
quadriplegia following a motor vehicle accident
did not differ substantially from that of recent
lottery winners [14].
These discrepancies suggest that either the
public does not understand how valuable life can
be for people with disabilities or that people with
disabilities consciously or subconsciously overstate
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their HRQoL [15]. It raises important questions
about whose HRQoL estimates should be used in
economic analyses [16].
Whether patients’ or the public’s HRQoL are
used can have important consequences for policy.
For example, imagine a treatment that delays, for
10 years, a patient’s need for a colostomy, costs
$10,000, and has no side effects. As stated above,
people who have not experienced colectemies es-
timate that having a colostomy would yield an
HRQoL of 0.8. This treatment, then, would in-
crease that person’s HRQoL from 0.8 to 1, yiel-
ding 0.2 quality adjusted life years or QALYs, for
a total of 2 QALYs over 10 years, at a cost of
$5000 per QALY. Now suppose, instead, that
HRQoL estimates were taken from people who
have colostomies. In that case, the intervention
would increase HRQoL from 0.92 to 1, for a
10 year gain of 0.8 QALYs, and an overall cost
effectiveness of $12,500 per QALY, less than half
the cost effectiveness based on general public
HRQoL estimates. As this extremely simplified
example suggests, the choice of whose HRQoL
estimates to use could significantly impact cost
effectiveness estimates.
Currently, the common practice is to rely on
QALY estimates derived from the general public,
by eliciting the general public’s attitude towards
specific illnesses or disabilities [17]. But what if
public attitudes reflect misunderstandings about
what it is like to live with paraplegia? Should such
misunderstandings be included in economic ana-
lyses? More generally, why might discrepancies
occur between HRQoL estimates of patients and
the general public? And are there any reasons to
wonder whether patients’ reports of their own
quality of life could themselves be in error? The
answers to these questions are important not only
for policy makers who are in charge of allocating
scarce health dollars, but also to patients facing
difficult medical decisions. For example, if people
with inflammatory bowel disease considering co-
lon surgery overestimate the HRQoL impact of a
colostomy, they might make the wrong decisions
about how to treat their illness [18].
In this article, we briefly outline some factors
(gleaned from the medical literature, psychology
literature, and also based on our own specula-
tion) that could potentially contribute to dis-
crepancies between patient and public HRQoL
estimates, discuss the implications these factors
have for health care policy and clinical practice,
and explore some of the challenges facing quality
of life researchers who are trying to sort out these
issues.
Sources of discrepancies between patient and public
HRQoL estimates
We group factors that could potentially contribute
to the discrepancy between patients’ and the
public’s HRQoL estimates into three rough cate-
gories, based on whether the discrepancy is caused
by (1) a failure to get patients and the public to
compare the same health states, (2) a failure to get
them to use the same ‘measuring stick,’ or (3) real
differences of opinion about the severity of various
illnesses or disabilities (Table 1).
Table 1. Rough categorization of factors potentially contributing to discrepancies
1. Comparing apples to oranges – failure to rate the same health states
a. Incomplete health state descriptions
b. Vagueness in health state descriptions about whether the health state is of recent onset
c. The focusing illusion: Forgetting to consider the big picture
2. Comparing apples to apples using different measuring sticks
a. Response shift: One person’s ‘10’ is another’s ‘11’
b. Different vantage points: How it looks depends on where you stand
c. Poor hedonic accounting: Difficulty providing a global summary of moment to moment HRQoL
3. Comparing apples to apples using the same measuring stick
a. Patient adaptation and public failure to predict adaptation
b. Contrast effects: What is a small pleasure to a lottery winner?
c. Shifting inter- and intra-personal comparisons
600
Comparing apples to oranges: Failure to rate the
same health states
Incomplete health state descriptions
Imagine the challenge of describing a colostomy to
someone unfamiliar with one. Boyd et al. [13]
presented people with the description of a colos-
tomy shown in Table 2. This is a relatively com-
plete description of a fairly discrete health state.
But it still lacks relevant details. What does it
mean, for example, to have ‘no voluntary control’
of the colostomy? What is involved in maintaining
a colostomy? What percentage of men will develop
impotence? Moreover, the description never really
shows people what a colostomy looks like or how
one operates.
One possible source of discrepancies in HRQoL
ratings is that patients and the public may be eva-
luating different health states. Even when provided
with identical descriptions of the health state being
evaluated, such descriptions are necessarily in-
complete, and patients and the public are likely to
fill in the blanks idiosyncratically, with information
based on their own personal experiences or stereo-
types. As a result, patients and the public may, in
effect, be evaluating different health states, leaving
us with comparisons of apples to oranges [13].
Vagueness in health state descriptions about
whether the health state is of recent onset
The incomparability of HRQoL ratings is aggra-
vated because health state descriptions are often
ambiguous about whether the health state is of
recent onset. Most health state descriptions ask
respondents to imagine what it would be like to
live with a specific set of symptoms – ‘Imagine you
are completely blind’ – without specifying how
long they have been in the health state. Conse-
quently, some nonpatients will consider what it
would be like to live chronically with the illness or
disability, but others will think about what it
would be like to receive the news that they had just
become blind. People considering the news value
of blindness might provide lower HRQoL esti-
mates than those who assume it has been long-
standing.
The focusing illusion: Failing to consider the big
picture
When asked to estimate the HRQoL of paraplegia,
many people focus on those activities affected by
paraplegia, such as their ability to walk or play
favorite sports, while ignoring activities unaffected
by paraplegia, such as watching television and
having a satisfying family life. Psychologists call
this inattention to broad life domains a ‘focusing
illusion’ – people overestimate the emotional im-
pact of events by disproportionately focusing on
narrow life domains influenced by the events [19,
20].
For example, in one study, college students in
California and Michigan were asked to state how
happy they are currently, and how happy they
would be living in the alternate state (e.g. how
happy do California students think they would be
living in Michigan) [19]. Both groups of students
reported similar levels of current happiness. Never-
theless, both groups also predicted that they would
be happier living in California than in Michigan.
The size of this predicted difference was correlated
with students’ beliefs about the relative impact
that weather has on their happiness. This study
Table 2. Scenario used by Boyd et al.* to describe aspects of life with a colostomy
Definition of colostomy: A portion of the colon is brought through the abdominal wall, thereby creating a
temporary or permanent opening
Reservoir: Limited
Incidence of evacuation: 24–48 hours with control measures
Consistency of discharge: Liquid to formed stool
Means of control: No voluntary control; potential control with diet, medication and/or irrigation
Maintenance: Usually requires an hour or less each morning or every other day
Special requirements: Plastic bag or dressing worn over the stoma
Activity: Full range of normal activities should be possible
Social problems: Unexpected odor, gas, or evacuation may occur
Other: In men, impotence may develop
* Reproduced from Med Dec Making 1990; 10: 61.
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has been interpreted as evidence that students
focused too narrowly on weather when making
these predictions, ignoring the possibility that
California might have more traffic jams, a higher
cost of living, or other features that on balance
make life just as good in Michigan.
To the extent that a focusing illusion is influ-
encing people’s health state ratings, they will no
longer be evaluating the same health state as pa-
tients. The general public will focus on a few small
aspects of the illness, whereas patients will con-
sider all aspects of their illness. For example,
someone might dwell on how a colostomy would
affect her willingness to go swimming in public
without reflecting on how infrequently she cur-
rently swims in public.
Comparing apples to apples using different
measuring sticks
Discrepancies resulting from incomplete health
state descriptions are not completely correctable.
But the goal of HRQoL measurements should be
to reduce this source of discrepancies to the
greatest extent possible. However, even if it were
possible to eliminate this source of discrepancies,
discrepancies are likely to persist in part because
patients and the public may not interpret HRQoL
measures in the same way.
Response shift: One person’s ‘10’ is another’s ‘11’
Imagine a person who is asked before and after the
onset of an illness to rate her HRQoL on a 1 to 10
scale. The illness may change her idea of what the
numbers 1 and 10 represent, a phenomenon called
response shift – changes in health lead to changing
internal standards for evaluating one’s own health,
making it difficult to compare HRQoL before and
after illness [21–25]. Response shift is due, in part,
to social comparisons [23]. Some patients respond
to HRQoL questions by comparing themselves to
other patients rather than to healthy people,
thereby artificially increasing their reported
HRQoL [24].
Response shift is also related to changing ex-
pectations. Imagine a 30-year-old and an 85-year-
old who both rate their HRQoL as 95 on the 0–100
scale. How confident should we be that their ans-
wers represent the same level of health? A rating of
95 for the elderly man might reflect his expecta-
tions of the best possible HRQoL at that age. This
response shift confounds HRQoL comparisons of
patients and the public.
Different vantage points: How it looks depends
on where you stand
Much the way the distance we are from two ob-
jects affects our ability to judge the distance be-
tween them, people’s current health affects their
evaluations of the severity of other health states
[26]. To a person in normal health, the difference
between hemiplegia and hemiplegia with aphasia
may seem small – both health states are extremely
severe. But, to a patient living with either health
state, the difference will appear much larger –
having or not having the ability to speak makes a
big difference to these patients.
Poor hedonic accounting: Difficulty providing a
global summary of moment to moment HRQoL
[27]
Discrepancies may occur because patients have
difficulty providing a global summary of their
moment to moment quality of life. This difficulty is
illustrated by a study on people’s perception of
pain, in which subjects were exposed to two
painful stimuli. One stimuli involved submersing a
hand in very cold ice water for 60 sec. The other
stimuli involved submersing the other hand in an
equally cold bucket for 60 sec, then keeping the
hand in the bucket for 30 more sec at a slightly
warmer, but still painful temperature. Subjects
were then told that they would have to repeat one
of the two stimuli. Asked which they would prefer
to repeat, unaware of the relative duration or
temperature of each stimuli, subjects thought the
second stimuli was less painful, because the final
intensity of the pain diminished. Thus, despite re-
ceiving a greater amount of pain with the 90 sec
stimuli, people generally wanted to repeat the
90 sec stimuli rather than the less painful 60 sec
one [28]. Their recall of their experience was dis-
proportionately affected by the intensity of pain at
the end of each stimulus, and failed to adequately
represent the stimulus duration.
Such a failure of recall could influence patients’
HRQoL estimates. Moment to moment, people
might feel bored or in pain or fatigued. But, when
asked to summarize their overall HRQoL, people
might consciously or subconsciously downplay
602
these feelings, or their estimates may reflect the
strongest feelings they typically experience during
the day, rather than the average feelings; or the
most recent feelings may dominate their global
accounting, which in research settings may mean
that a good or bad parking spot at the medical
center may influence HRQoL ratings more than
patients’ health related experiences [29].
The potential effect of poor hedonic accounting
on the discrepancy can be illustrated with the ex-
ample of a person with paraplegia who is given a
pager or palm pilot and provides daily ratings of
subjective well-being of 5, 6, 5, 9, 5, 6, and 6 over
the course of a week [30, 31]. When asked to rate
his overall HRQoL at the end of the week, the
patient gives a rating of 8 out of 10 because he
overweights the peak of the sequence, which is 9
[29]. The general public, on the other hand, who
do not overweight any particular day, estimate his
HRQoL at 6 out of 10 – the average of his
HRQoL over the interval. The discrepancy occurs,
in this example, because patients place great im-
portance on peak intensity while the general public
bases its estimates on their prediction of patients’
overall averages.
Comparing apples to apples using the same
measuring stick
The final general category includes those factors
that potentially reflect real differences of opinion
and between patients and the public about the
HRQoL of various health states.
Patient adaptation and public failure to predict
adaptation
Patients with chronic illnesses often adapt physi-
cally and emotionally to their health states. Ad-
aptation is, in part, physical. A person with
blindness may learn how to read Braille and how
to ambulate with a cane. Adaptation is also psy-
chological. When people lose the ability to perform
certain activities, they start preferring alternative
activities – an amateur musician with carpal tunnel
syndrome may give up performance and spend
more time listening to music or reading novels.
Psychological adaptation also occurs through a
reduction in expectations. A patient with severe
emphysema may forget that long walks in the park
used to be an important part of her life. Psycho-
logical adaptation also occurs because strong
emotions rarely persist, similar to the way that
people’s sensory perceptions adjust to changing
conditions [32]. People feel intense delight after
being relieved of a painful toothache, but soon
return to their baseline level of happiness. This
lack of persistence of strong emotions partly ex-
plains the lottery winner and paraplegia study.
Once people get over good or bad news, they re-
vert to their baseline emotional state [33]. Adap-
tation would not contribute to discrepancies
between patient and nonpatient HRQoL ratings if
nonpatients were able to predict adaptation and
adjust their ratings accordingly. However, when
specifically asked to consider adaptation, people
consistently underpredict their own ability to
adapt [34].
What is the difference between a focusing illu-
sion and failure to consider adaptation? A focus-
ing illusion is the failure to appreciate that not all
life domains or life events will be equally affected
by a given change in circumstances. For example,
when considering the impact of paraplegia on their
quality of life, people may fail to consider that
paraplegia will not affect their ability to enjoy a
good television show, a pleasant conversation, or a
dinner with family and friends.
By contrast, a failure to consider adaptation is
the failure to appreciate the fact that one’s emo-
tional response to the given change in circum-
stances will diminish over time. Anyone who has
read a description of paraplegia should recognize
that paraplegia does not affect his or her ability to
enjoy a good television show. However, they may
fail to consider that the grief they will feel upon
finding out that they have become paraplegic will
subside over time and that the sense of loss that
they feel because they have to abandon favorite
pastimes will be replaced by the joy they feel in
other pastimes.
Contrast effects: What is a small pleasure
to a lottery winner?
When asked to rate how much pleasure they would
gain from receiving a compliment, reading a
magazine, or hearing a funny joke, lottery winners
report less pleasure than does the nonlottery win-
ning general public [14]. Apparently, the pleasure
of winning a lottery makes smaller pleasures ap-
pear inconsequential.
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The pleasure of good events and the pain of bad
ones are moderated by contrast effects [35]. Posi-
tive experiences, while making people happy, can
also make them less excited about similar experi-
ences. An exquisite meal at a three-star French
restaurant makes people less satisfied with a two-
star French restaurant. Similarly, horrible life
events make people less bothered by less severe
bad events [36]. A patient with MS may shrug off
the emotional impact of a disfiguring rash that
would devastate someone else. Because of contrast
effects, patients’ HRQoL may be relatively unaf-
fected by other bad events.
If the general public overlooks contrast effects
when rating unfamiliar health states, they will
overestimate the detrimental impact illness has on
well-being. For example, if a patient with MS is
evaluating the probable quality of life of another
hypothetical person with MS, she might have
learned from her own experience that MS has
made it easier for herself to emotionally deal with
minor day-to-day frustrations that used to bother
her significantly. When she responds to the
HRQoL elicitation, she will bring that knowledge
to bear upon her final response. A member of the
general public, on the other hand, may not con-
sider the likelihood that having MS would create
these types of contrast effects. Consequently, their
HRQoL estimates will be uninfluenced by the
presence of contrast effects.
Shifting inter- and intra-personal comparisons
Pleasure and pain result, in part, from compari-
sons we make, to other people and to ourselves at
earlier points in time [24, 37–39]. The first few
weeks driving a new car are extremely enjoyable,
because we compare it to the clunker we traded in.
Over time, the importance of this comparison di-
minishes and so too does our elation with the
automobile, even if it is still running perfectly.
Analogously, patients’ early experiences with ill-
ness, especially sudden illness, will be very dis-
tressing if they compare it to their previous health.
Over time, their experience will not be so influ-
enced by such comparisons, and hence, the distress
that they cause will dissipate. Likewise, as patients
gradually come into contact with other patients,
some of them with more severe conditions than
their own, these changing comparisons may reduce
their own level of distress. To the degree that the
public is unaware of these effects, these shifting
comparisons will lead them to underestimate pa-
tients’ quality of life.
Implications
We have listed a variety of reasons why patients
and the public may provide different HRQoL es-
timates for health states. Our list is not exhaustive,
and the categories are not always mutually exclu-
sive. For example, contrast effects may, in part,
explain how people adapt to adversity. Neverthe-
less, the list should help policy experts and quality
of life researchers think through the implications
of discrepancies that occur between patient and
public HRQoL estimates.
An understanding of the causes of the observed
discrepancies could illuminate debates about
whose values, or HRQoL estimates, should be
used in economic analyses of health care [40]. For
example, as stated above, the current economic
standard is to elicit HRQoL estimates from the
general public rather than from patients, because
economic analyses are meant to guide social poli-
cies and not individual patient decisions [17].
Nevertheless, some potential sources of discrep-
ancies between patients and the public suggest
that public HRQoL estimates may be faulty. If,
for example, members of the public are susceptible
to a focusing illusion state their estimates may not
be appropriate for determining social policies. At
the same time, our discussion shows ways that
patients’ HRQoL estimates may also be inappro-
priate for determining social policy. If, for exam-
ple, patients’ responses are due to response shifts
may not want this to influence policy decisions
[15].
Challenges for quality of life researchers
We have outlined a number of factors contributing
to discrepancies between patient and public
HRQoL estimates. One of our goals in doing this
is to bring together insights from disparate fields
and bring them to the attention of quality of life
researchers. For example, among those debating
whose values ought to be included in cost effec-
tiveness analyses, we have yet to hear much dis-
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cussion about the role of a focusing illusion, or of
contrast effects, in explaining these discrepancies.
Another goal was to provide a framework
around which researchers could study discrepan-
cies. The most important challenge facing re-
searchers, we think, is to conduct studies that shed
light on why these discrepancies occur. Several
obstacles stand in the way of such research efforts.
Making health state descriptions complete
and balanced
A challenge for researchers is to find ways to im-
prove the completeness and balance of health state
descriptions. Such descriptions can never be com-
plete, of course. But there may be ways to stan-
dardize health state descriptions to make sure that
the effect of illnesses on common or important life
functions is not overlooked.
Researchers may want to build some ‘debiasing
techniques’ into their health state descriptions. For
example, if it is important to avoid a focusing il-
lusion when eliciting public attitudes toward
paraplegia, then health state descriptions should
remind people that paraplegia does not affect their
ability to watch television, enjoy a good meal, etc.
[1]. Such efforts would raise questions of balance,
however. How many unaffected life activities
should be mentioned? Should people be reminded
of their ability to adapt to adversity too? And if so,
how should they be reminded?
In making health state descriptions more com-
plete, researchers may want to experiment with
video and computer based methods of describing
health states. Such methods can allow the public to
witness testimonials from patients with the illness
in question, or see pictures relevant to under-
standing the illnesses. Nevertheless, such vivid in-
formation itself may have an undue influence on
people’s perceptions [41].
Keeping in mind the goals of health care
Researchers studying the discrepancy between pa-
tients’ and the public’s evaluations of health states,
we believe, will benefit by thinking clearly about the
policy implications of their research. Suppose, for
example, that researchers concluded that a major
contributor to discrepancies was failure among the
general public to predict how much they would
adapt to adversity. Suppose, similarly, that state of
the art research on utility measurement showed that
significant illnesses had large effects on people’s
functional abilities but relatively small effects on
their mood or utility. In such a case, it is worthwhile
to ask ourselves whether the goal of health care
ought to be to maximize subjective well-being,
health related utility, or something else [15]. If
people really are on a hedonic treadmill, and tend to
revert to their baseline level of happiness after suf-
fering permanent disabilities, should society spend
large amounts of money to keep them from be-
coming disabled? What if, as we believe is likely to
be the case, the same patients who report a high
quality of life would be willing to pay substantial
amounts to restore their former health? This is a
case of discrepancies, not between different people
being asked the same question, but between the
same person being asked different questions. And,
again the question is which answer, if either, should
guide policy.
Conclusion
To date, there are no perfect measures to deter-
mine just how happy people are. And there is no
gold standard to estimate people’s subjective
quality of life. Nevertheless, whatever makes up
happiness or quality of life, it appears that many
illnesses have far less impact on subjective quality
of life than many of us would predict. This is good
news. As much as we strive to reduce the burdens
of illness, it is comforting to remember the
strength of the human spirit. At the same time, it is
worth remembering how this strength of spirit
complicates quality of life measurement.
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